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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the role of insurance on the allocation of production inputs
in an economy with nancial frictions. It is motivated by the increasing evidence
that resource misallocation across individual production units may account for a
substantial share of the income dierences we observe across countries. Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) use microdata on manufacturing establishments in China and India
to show that reallocating capital and labor to equalize marginal products to the
extent observed in the United States could increase manufacturing TFP up to 50
percent in China and 60 percent in India. Banerjee et al. (2003), Banerjee and
Munshi (2004), or Alfaro et al. (2008), who study income dierences caused by
the allocation of resources across heterogeneous rms using data for 80 countries,
present evidence that nancial market imperfections and misallocation of resources
can explain a large part of the TFP dierences between rich and poor countries.
These insights have led many researchers to ask why capital is not allocated
eciently across rms. Among possible candidates, frictions in nancial markets
appear as a natural explanation of resource misallocation.1 Because of lack of
enforcement, commitment or information, high productivity rms are not able to
borrow the necessary resources to run their businesses at the optimal size while
low productivity rms survive and do not exit the market. In the quantitative
macro models, resource reallocation derived from removing ineciencies in credit
markets has large eects on output and measured TFP (see, among others, Buera
et al. (2010), Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2010), or Moll (2010)).
Using the evidence on nancial frictions and entrepreneurial activity presented
in the next Section, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model with hetero-
geneous agents with occupational choice, nancial constraints and endogenous
nancial and insurance markets. Each agent compares the expected value he or
she would obtain from being a worker to the expected value of becoming an en-
trepreneur. A worker receives a wage while an entrepreneur establishes a rm
with capital investment, employs other agents as workers, and realizes prot from
a decreasing-returns-to-scale production technology. As entrepreneurs must com-
mit resources to their risky business projects, agents with low assets but high skills
might be constrained in their entry or rm-size decisions.
The occupational heterogeneity is important as workers (together with the less
productive or unconstrained entrepreneurs) lend their assets to entrepreneurs who
can use them more productively. Financial intermediation that allocates resources
to the most productive use could reduce these nancing constraints and increase
eciency. Transferring resources from one agent to another is costly as nancial
intermediaries need capital and labor to perform these tasks. Therefore, the level of
economic activity and the level of nancial intermediation are jointly determined.
1For other explanations of resource misallocation see the references in Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008).
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We calibrate the parameters associated with nancial intermediation by matching
the share of the nancial sector both in GDP and in input markets observed in
the data.
Finally, we include the possibility that nancial intermediaries also provide
insurance in addition to channeling credit. We are interested in analyzing rst,
the extent to which individual agents endogenously decide to reduce the risk they
face, and second, whether and by how much the endogenous insurance markets
alleviate the nancing constraint and improve the ecient allocation of resources.2
We simulate four economies that dier in the quality of nancial intermediation: we
compare allocations and distribution of resources in an economy without nancial
intermediation to a benchmark economy with borrowing and lending as well as to
two insurance economies (with ex-ante insurance and ex-post risk sharing).
Our results provide some answers to a recent paper by Hurst and Lusardi
(2004) who challenge the view that personal wealth is a key factor for the decision
to become an entrepreneur. Looking at dierent wealth groups, they estimate that
personal wealth is statistically important only for the richest households in the top
quintile of the distribution. Since these households are quite wealthy, it is dicult
to interpret the importance of wealth for these households as a sign of borrowing
constraints. And as the initial capital of many entrants is rather small, it might
seem that wealth constraint is not a major deterrent to entrepreneurship.
However, Quadrini (2009) argues that nancial constraints may not be a de-
terrent to becoming an entrepreneur but may aect in important ways the initial
operation of a business and its future. This is what we show in our dynamic model.
Financial market imperfections keep the initial scale of businesses far below the
optimal size. In other words, what plays a crucial role is the impact of nan-
cial constraints on the behavior of the entrepreneur after he or she has made the
occupational choice.
Second, we nd that nancial markets do also aect the entry/exit decisions
by general equilibrium eects. A well functioning nancial intermediation makes
personal wealth less relevant when allocating productive capital to managerial
skills: the most talented entrepreneurs can enter and operate rms closer to the
optimal size. This in turn increases demand for labor and capital. Higher equi-
librium wages and interest rates increase the opportunity cost of becoming an
entrepreneur for the less talented agents. This further improves the skill composi-
tion of entrepreneurs and increases the amount of resources available to the most
talented ones. We show in our numerical simulations that this general equilibrium
mechanism increase the productivity threshold of entrants: there are fewer but
more productive entrepreneurs and the median rm size increases.
Third, borrowing and lending by itself may not be sucient for the ecient
2For an exogenously imposed risk sharing see Heathcote et al. (2009). Karaivanov et al.
(2006) estimate credit market imperfections due to limited liability and moral hazard in Thailand.
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allocation of capital to entrepreneurial skills. In our model, entrepreneurs face
a nancing constraint as they have to pay debts and salaries of workers in each
state of the world, namely if the project fails. Poorer entrepreneurs are not willing
to run rms close the optimal size if they are exposed to this large income risk.
When nancial markets also insure entrepreneurs against these potential losses,
the allocation of resources becomes much more ecient.
Relative to the economy without nancial markets, our benchmark economy
with borrowing and lending increases the total factor productivity by 19.4% and
welfare by 17.5%. Both insurance and risk sharing increase eciency by additional
7% and welfare by 3%. Increased competition among entrepreneurs reduces their
prots. All the welfare gains apply to workers who benet from higher equilibrium
wages and the possibility to receive return on their savings.
Overall, we nd that higher quality of nancial markets increases eciency,
improves average welfare as well as reduces inequality. We show that the eciency
gains operate through alleviated nancing constraints. This is because, conditional
on a level of wealth, high skill and high marginal productivity entrepreneurs can
enter and/or expand their rms, while general equilibrium eects provide incen-
tives for low skill entrepreneurs to reduce their rms or exit and become workers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relationship be-
tween nancial intermediation and entrepreneurship in the United States. In the
following three sections we describe four economies that dier in the nancial in-
termediation services they provide. First, we develop the benchmark economy
with borrowing and lending intermediated by a competitive endogenous banking
sector. We then add insurance markets that oer actuarially fair risk sharing and
insurance contracts. Fourth, for eciency comparisons we present an economy
where the nancial markets are missing. In Section 6 we characterize the eects
of nancial markets on entrepreneurial decisions. Results of numerical simulations
are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Entrepreneurial Activity in the United States
First, we will briey describe the relationship between nancial intermediation
and entrepreneurship in the United States. We follow Gentry and Hubbard (2000)
and dene an entrepreneur as someone who combines upfront business investment
with entrepreneurial skill to obtain the chance of earning economic prots. Ac-
cording to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF 1989), 8.7% households report
active business assets greater than $5,000 (9.5% report business assets greater than
$1,000). Similarly, in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID 1994), 10.4%
of families own a business or have a nancial interest in some business enterprise.
The following paragraphs relate the wealth and income data to occupational choice
in the United States.
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De Nardi et al. (2007) document that U.S. entrepreneurs are characterized by
their high propensity to accumulate capital, risk taking, and committing skills and
resources to their businesses. The Gini coecient for family wealth is between 0.78
and 0.84, depending on the year and survey (PSID and SCF, respectively). The
Gini coecient for family income is 0.45 in the PSID and 0.54 in the SCF. In the
PSID, the top 1 percent of families owns around 29% of the total household wealth
and around 8% of the total income. The top 5 percent owns already 50% of the
wealth and receives 20% of the income. Finally, the top decile owns more than
60% of the wealth and receives more than 32% of the income. The percentage of
business families increases in higher wealth classes: Quadrini (1999a) documents
that about half of all families in the top 5% are business families. At the same
time, the concentration of wealth among business families is not purely explained
by the concentration of income. Quadrini (1999b) and Gentry and Hubbard (2000)
report that entrepreneurs are wealthy because they not only earn more income but
also save relatively more than workers. Entrepreneurs, being such a small fraction
of the population, receive 22% of the total income and own 40% of the total wealth.
The ratio of wealth to income is about twice as large for business families (6.77
versus 2.94).
Entrepreneurial portfolios are very undiversied. Gentry and Hubbard (2000)
nd that active businesses account for 42% of entrepreneurs' assets (even in the
top wealth classes). Also, entrepreneurs hold relatively less of their wealth in
liquid assets. In the survey of Characteristics of Business Owners (2002), seventy
percent of the owners of employer respondent rms reported that their business was
their primary source of income. The turnover of business families is substantial.
Entrepreneurial income is more volatile than the labor income of workers. Heaton
and Lucas (2000) nd that the median standard deviation of the growth rate of
nonfarm proprietary income is 64% annually while the median standard deviation
of the growth rate of real wage income is only 35% annually. Evans (1987) estimates
that the exit rate is around 4.5% (the rate for entrepreneurs with one year of tenure
is much higher, see Quadrini (1999a)). Not only face entrepreneurs high risk in
their occupation, it also has a future value compared to initial income: Hamilton
(2000) nds evidence that most entrepreneurs enter and persist in business despite
the fact that they have lower initial earnings in paid employment, with a median
earnings dierential of 35 percent.
Available evidence suggests that entrepreneurs are constrained by their wealth.
Based on the National Longitudinal Survey, Evans and Leighton (1989) nd that
men with greater assets are more likely to become self-employed all else being
equal. They estimate in their model that entrepreneurs can borrow up to 50% of
their current assets.3 The Federal Reserve Survey of Terms of Business Lending
3In an important eld study Paulson and Townsend (2002) nd that two-thirds of Thai
business households are nancially constrained, mostly due to limited commitment problem
faced by the poor entrepreneurs.
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reveals that small loans are more often secured by collateral.4 Small rms pay fewer
dividends, take on more debt, and invest more. In terms of the aggregate value of
small rm debt, almost 90% of credit comes from traditional sources, mostly lines
of credit and loans. Between 65 percent and 79 percent of entrepreneurs started
their own business and almost half of entrepreneurs use their own or their family's
savings. Fazzari et al. (1988) report that internal nance in the form of retained
earnings generates the majority of net funds for rms of all size categories: the
average retention ratio is largest for small rms (80%) and lowest for the largest
rms (50%). Finally, Eisner (1978) nds that the timing of investment in small
rms is more sensitive to prots than it is in large rms.
At the same time, entrepreneurial activity is a very important feature of the
U.S. economy. Small rms play an important role in innovation, technological
change and productivity growth. Davis et al. (1996) show that the rates of job
creation and job destruction in U.S. manufacturing rms decrease in rm size and
that, conditional on the initial size, small rms grow faster than large rms. In
the 1990s, small businesses employed more than half of the workforce and created
three-fourths of the new jobs.
The benchmark model in the next Section attempts to replicate this list of
data on entrepreneurial activity in the United States. Motivated by the above
empirical regularities, agents will be identied by their accumulated level of assets
and entrepreneurial ability. In the presence of nancial constraints, occupational
choice and entrepreneurial decisions will be functions of this individual state and
equilibrium prices.
3 The Economy
In this paper we describe four economies that dier in nancial intermediation
services they provide. In this Section we develop the benchmark economy with
borrowing and lending intermediated by a competitive endogenous banking sector.
There is a continuum of agents with mass one. These individuals dier in the
amount of accumulated assets and their talent (productivity). Each agent decides
whether to allocate his talent to be an entrepreneur and establish a rm or to be
a worker and work for an entrepreneur. We assume that there exists a nancial
4In 2000, of all commercial and industrial loans in the United States, 83% required collateral
for loans smaller than $99,000, 74% for loans smaller than $1 million, 46.9% for loans smaller
than $10 million, and only 31.7% for loans greater than $10 million. In Europe, the 2010 ECB
survey of small and medium size enterprises (SME) shows that around 60% of small and medium
size enterprises (SME) use at least one source of debt nancing. The most prevalent source of
debt nancing has been the bank: 30% of companies have used bank overdraft facilities or a
credit line and 26% have received a bank loan. Lack of collateral is the most signicant obstacle
for establishing a rm, with about 15% of loans were fully rejected. See De Nardi et al. (2007)
for a similar evidence for the United States.
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intermediation sector that provides credit services.
Each agent is endowed with a unit of time and evaluates streams of consumption
c with a utility function
E
" 1X
t=0
tu (ct)
#
;
where  2 (0; 1) and u : <+ ! < is a bounded, strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and twice dierentiable continuous function that satises the Inada conditions.
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of every period, agents are
identied by a level of accumulated assets a 2 A = [0;1) and by an idiosyncratic
productivity shock z 2 Z = [z; z]. This productivity level is carried from the
previous period and represents a signal for the eective productivity the agent will
have later in the period when production takes place, z0 2 Z. Given a and the
signal z, rst, each agents makes the occupational choice and decides whether to
become a worker or an entrepreneur. Workers deposit their assets at the nancial
intermediaries and oer their labor services in the market. Entrepreneurs decide
how much capital and labor to use in production. Importantly, they have to
commit capital and labor before their eective productivity shock is realized. This
feature of the model reects the riskiness of entrepreneurial occupation. In the
literature, entrepreneurs usually do not face any risk from running their businesses
as their occupational and input decisions are made after the productivity shock is
observed (for example Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Meh (2008), or Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008)).
An agent who decides to be an entrepreneur and commits his capital and labor
input, will draw his productivity level from a Markov process with a monotone
transition function Q that satises the Feller property and the mixing condition.
If an agent decides to be a worker, he will draw his eective skill, z0, from a
distribution  , and will obtain labor income equal to z0w where w is the equilibrium
wage.
At the end of the period, the eective productivity shock of each agent z0
is realized, production at rms takes place, workers are paid their wages and
entrepreneurs realize prots or losses. Finally, each agent decides how much to
consume c and the amount of savings a0. The eective productivity shock z0 is
carried to the next period as the signal for future productivity shocks. All assets
depreciate at the rate  2 (0; 1).
Banks are in the business of intermediating credit. The supply of credit comes
from depositors, i.e. all workers as well as entrepreneurs with assets in excess of
their capital needs. The demand for credit is from entrepreneurs whose ecient
size of rm in terms of capital is larger than their accumulated assets. The in-
termediation technology is represented by an aggregate constant-returns-to-scale
production function that transforms the deposits of workers and non-borrowing en-
trepreneurs into loans for borrowing entrepreneurs. Intermediation is costly as the
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zero-prot representative bank employs capitalKL and labor NL. The equilibrium
interest rate on deposits, rD, and loans, rL, will be described below.
At the stationary equilibrium, the problem of an agent who enters the period
with the pair (a; z) can be summarized by the value function
v(a; z) = max
Z
vW (a; z0) (dz0);max
k;n
Z
vE(a; z0)Q(z; dz0)

vi(a; z0) = max
c;a0
fu(c) + v(a0; z0)g; (1)
where the superscript W denotes a worker and E an entrepreneur, with i =W;E.
Notice again that entrepreneurs must commit capital and labor inputs before the
eective productivity shock z0 is known.
3.1 A Worker's Problem
If an agent with assets a and a signal ability shock z decides to be a worker, his
budget constraint is
c+ a0  (1  )a+ W (a; z0) = (1 + rD)a+ wz0; (2)
with income dened as W (a; z0) = (rD + )a + wz0. The worker deposits all his
assets at the bank for an interest rate rD and receives a wage w.
3.2 An Entrepreneur's Problem
An entrepreneur who uses capital k and labor n and draws an eective productivity
shock z0, produces according a production function
y = z0f (k; n) = z0
 
kn1 

; (3)
where  2 (0; 1) and  < 1. The production function exhibits decreasing returns
to scale which, as in Lucas (1978), can be thought of as capturing the presence of
decreasing returns to managerial control. We assume hired labor n consists of a
pool of perfectly diversied workers with the average workers' skill normalized to
one. The budget constraint for an entrepreneur is
c+ a0  (1  )a+ (a; z0jz); (4)
where  is the prot that depends on whether the entrepreneur is a depositor or a
borrower. Entrepreneurs who have enough assets to nance their projects at the
desired level without borrowing from the bank, i.e. a  k(a; z), are net depos-
itors and receive (rD + )(a   k) from the bank. On the other hand, those en-
trepreneurs who need to borrow to obtain additional capital for their projects, i.e.,
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entrepreneurs for whom k(a; z)  a, are net borrowers and must pay (rL+)(k a)
to the bank. Combining the prot functions for both types of entrepreneurs,
(a; z0jz) = z0  kn1    wn+ (rD + )maxf0; a  kg   (rL + )maxf0; k   ag:
We assume there is no possibility of default on bank loans and wages of hired
workers. Also, we abstract from a xed cost associated with operating a business
modeled in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), among others, and think of the
endogenous opportunity cost of forgone equilibrium wages/prots as the main
determinant of entry/exit outcomes that arise from comparing the expected present
discounted value of each occupation.
3.3 The Financing Constraint
The specication of the Inada-type utility function together with the uncertainty
in entrepreneurial prots imply that agents with a low level of accumulated assets
may be constrained with respect to the size of their entrepreneurial project. In
particular, the total entrepreneurial income must guarantee a nonnegative con-
sumption for all possible realizations of prots. Therefore, an entrepreneurs must
have a sucient level of accumulated assets to satisfy the following constraint5
(1  )a+ (a; z0)  0 for all z0 2 Z: (5)
Since in each period Q(z; fzg) > 0 for all z 2 Z, this ex-post nancing con-
straint must be satised for the lowest eective ability shock z = 0, that is
(1  )a+ (a; z)  0:
For entrepreneurs with a high signal z, that is for those who would like to borrow
and hire many workers, (a; z) represents a large loss they must nance from their
accumulated assets. This potential loss might prevent those with low savings to
run a project at its ecient size. At the same time, running a very small rm might
decrease the expected prots below the opportunity cost of running the project in
the rst place.6 Therefore, the nancing constraint may have important allocation
eects on entry and especially on the rm size decisions.
3.4 The Financial Intermediary
In the benchmark economy, nancial intermediation consists of banks that accept
deposits and provide loans to entrepreneurs. Because of perfect competition in the
industry and the constant returns to scale technology for loans, banks earn zero
5This constraint can also be motivated by limited enforceability of contracts.
6The main opportunity cost is the forgone equilibrium wage from being a worker. The future
value of a project will be discussed in Section 6.
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prots and are modeled as a representative bank. The bank owns no resources
and needs to nance all its operations from deposits. Total deposits from workers
and depositing entrepreneurs are
D =
Z
EW
maxf0; a  kg(da dz):
Financial intermediation and insurance is costly, requiring capital and labor inputs
(KL; NL). Deposits are used to provide loans L to entrepreneurs as well as the
capital input for the bank,
D = L+KL: (6)
We assume that the bank and entrepreneurs hire workers in the same labor market
at the same equilibrium wage. The problem of the bank is to choose its inputs
(KL; NL) to maximize prots,
L =
 
rL   rDL   rD + KL   wNL;
subject to the loan production technology
L = ZB(KL)
B
(NL)1 
B
;
where ZB is a technology parameter and B 2 (0; 1). We assume banks lend to a
perfectly diversied pool of entrepreneurs and as there is no default, they do not
face any risk.
3.5 Stationary equilibrium
At the aggregate level, the equilibrium outcome of these decisions is a probability
measure  that determines the density over agents' individual states (a; z), with a
law of motion
0(A0;Z 0) =
Z
S
(z; dz0)(da dz);
where S = f(a; z0) : a0(a; z0) 2 A0 and z0 2 Z 0g and  is a transition selector
 (z; dz0)   (dz0)jW +Q(z; dz0)jE;
that determines the end of period productivity from the beginning of period pro-
ductivity for each occupation. The measure of agents with next period's state in
the set (A0, Z 0) consists of agents whose skills evolve to the set Z 0 and whose
savings belong to the set A0.
The concept of stationary equilibria requires that assets supplied by all agents
equal the amount of capital demanded by the entrepreneurs and banks, that labor
supply by workers equals the labor hired by entrepreneurs and banks, and that all
allocations be feasible for a time invariant probability measure ,
(A0;Z 0) =
Z
S
(z; dz0)(da dz);
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Denition 1 A stationary recursive equilibrium with borrowing and lending
is constant prices (rD, rL, w), value functions (v; vW ; vE), policy functions
(k; n; c; a0), a probability measure , transition selector (z; dz0), and aggregate
levels (A;KL; D; L;N;NL; Y ), such that
1. at given prices the policy functions solve the optimization problem of each
agent (a; z);
2. at given prices, the aggregate levels (KL,NL) maximize prots for the repre-
sentative bank;
3. the probability measure  is time invariant;
4. prices are such that markets clear: these are the market for deposits,
D =
Z
maxf0; a  kg(da dz) = L+KL;
the loans market,
L = ZB(KL)
B
(NL)1 
B
=
Z
E
maxf0; k   ag(da dz);
and the labor market,
N =
Z
W
z0  (dz0)(da dz) =
Z
E
n(a; z)(da dz) +NL;
with Z
W
(da dz) +
Z
E
(da dz) = 1;
5. the aggregate feasibility constraint holds at equality: for goodsZ
fc(a; z0) + a0(a; z0)g(z; dz0)(da dz) =
=
Z
z0f(k(a; z); n(a; z))Q(z; dz0)(da dz) = Y;
and assets,
A =
Z
a (da dz) =
Z
E
k(a; z)(da dz) +KL:
4 Insurance and Risk Sharing
Contracts that could alleviate the nancing constraint might have important ef-
ciency eects if they allow the more talented entrepreneurs to enter and/or run
their rms at a more ecient size. In this Section we describe two types of such
contracts, risk sharing and insurance. Entrepreneurs will be able to choose the
degree of prot uncertainty they want to bear. We assume that all allocations are
fully observable and contracts fully enforceable. We discuss asymmetric informa-
tion and the moral hazard and the adverse selection problem in Section 7.
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4.1 Ex-Post Risk Sharing
An ex-post risk sharing contract allows entrepreneurs to insure against the prot
risk by receiving transfers from the pool of realized prots of other entrepreneurs.
These transfers are administered by the nancial sector. As the risk sharing con-
tracts are actuarially fair and the insurer has zero prot, we include these services
with the representative bank. Similarly to borrowing and lending, the transfer
technology is costly in terms of capital and labor. To pay for these inputs, the
bank requires a price p to be paid per unit of each transfer made.
To illustrate a simple case of a full risk sharing, imagine a contract that always
delivers the expected prots E[(a; z0)jz] to each entrepreneur in any state of
the world. That is, in the case of a prot realization (a; z0) < E[(a; z0)jz] an
entrepreneur receives a transfer E[(a; z0)jz]  (a; z0), and sends away a transfer
if the prot realization is above the expected value. Then his budget constraint is
c+ a0  (1  )a+ E[(a; z0)jz]  p jE [(a; z0)jz]  (a; z0)j :
This example of full risk sharing would impose an extreme degree of insurance
on entrepreneurs who might prefer less or even no risk sharing. In our economy,
we allow each entrepreneur to choose a fraction x 2 [0; 1] of prots he wants to
insure,
v(a; z) = max
Z
vW (a; z0) (dz0);max
k;n;x
Z
vE(a; z0)Q(z; dz0)

:
In this case, the entrepreneur's after-transfer prot xE[(a; z0)jz] + (1  x)(a; z0)
leads to a budget constraint
c+ a0  (1  )a+ xE[(a; z0)jz] + (1  x)(a; z0)  xp jE [(a; z0)jz]  (a; z0)j :
The ex-post nancing constraint now becomes
(1  )a+ xE [(a; z0)jz] + (1  x)(a; z0)  xp jE [(a; z0)jz]  (a; z0)j  0; (7)
for all z0 2 Z.
We show in Section 6 that the nancing constraint is less binding than in the
benchmark economy. An important feature of the risk sharing is that transfers
are received/paid in all states of the world, including the good states in which
prots are high. Thus successful entrepreneurs who might want to invest heavily
into their business have less income than without risk sharing or with a standard
insurance contract described below.
With risk sharing, the representative bank now intermediates credit between
agents as well as provides insurance services. Deposits are used for loans L and
both capital inputs of the bank, KL and KI ,
D = L+KL +KI :
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In providing insurance, the bank chooses inputs (KI ; N I) to maximize prots,
I = pI    rD + KI   wN I ; (8)
where I is the total amount of risk sharing transfers (to those who have less than
expected prots as well from those who have more than expected prots),
I = x
Z
jE [(a; z0)jz]  (a; z0jz)j Q(z; dz0)(da dz):
We assume a the same Cobb-Douglas technology for the risk-sharing services
I = ZB(KI)
B
(N I)1 
B
: (9)
Because of perfect competition in the insurance industry and the constant returns
to scale assumption for the risk sharing technology, insurance earns zero prots.
Both parts of the bank, the borrowing/lending and insurance services, take prices
as well as the total amount of deposits as given when making production decisions.
4.2 Ex-Ante Insurance
An ex-ante insurance contract insures an entrepreneur's prots in a bad state.
That is, if the realized prot (a; z0) < , the entrepreneur receives an insurance
payment   (a; z0), and zero otherwise. As the contract provides for actuarially
fair insurance, the insurer has zero prots and is again a part of the representative
bank. The insurance technology is costly, paid for by a price p proportional to the
expected insurance payments (insurance premium).
We allow each entrepreneur to choose the insurance level as an amount of
prots  2 ( 1; E [(a; z0)jz]) below which he receives the insurance payment,
v(a; z) = max
Z
vW (a; z0) (dz0);max
k;n;
Z
vE(a; z0)Q(z; dz0)

:
The insurance premium is paid ex-ante (when inputs are chosen, i.e. before
prots are realized) and must be nanced from accumulated assets of the en-
trepreneur. Thus the insurance premium payment represents an ex-ante nancing
constraint and reduces the amount of assets available for investment in the project
to ~a < a. As the amount of resources paid for insurance and the project's size are
chosen jointly, they represent a xed point that depends on the wealth and skill
of the entrepreneur. The ex-ante insurance premium constraint is
~a  a  (1 + p)
Z
max f0;    (~a; z0jz)g Q(z; dz0)  0; (10)
where the prot is
(~a; z0jz) = z0(kn1 )   wn+ (rD + )maxf0; ~a  kg   (rL + )maxf0; k   ~ag:
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The budget constraint becomes
c+ a0  (1  )a+max f; (~a; z0)g   (1 + p)
Z
max f0;    (~a; z0jz)g Q(z; dz0);
with the ex-post nancing constraint
(1 )a+max f; (~a; z0)g  (1+p)
Z
max f0;    (~a; z0jz)g Q(z; dz0)  0; (11)
for all z0 2 Z.
Compared to the risk sharing contract, an insurance contract can provide the
same level of insurance without taking resources from entrepreneurs when prots
are high. We show in Section 6 that it relaxes the ex-post nancing constraint but
it adds a new, ex-ante nancing constraint required for the insurance premium.
Although the amount of the premium is chosen by each entrepreneur, the ex-
ante premium constraint might limit the entry into entrepreneurship or the size of
business rms for poor agents.
As with risk sharing, the insurance services require inputs (KI ; N I) that max-
imize prots (8), where I is now the total amount of insurance payments,
I =
Z
max f0;    (a; z0jz)g Q(z; dz0)(da dz):
We assume the same technology to produce insurance transfers as in equation (9).
Again, because of perfect competition in the insurance industry and the con-
stant returns to scale production function, insurance services earn zero prots.
We also assume in this case that they take prices as well as the total amount of
deposits as given when making production decisions.
4.3 Stationary Equilibrium with Insurance
The denition of a stationary recursive equilibrium with risk sharing or insurance
now also includes the insurance sector, the price of insurance, and the insurance
decisions of entrepreneurs.
Denition 2 A stationary recursive equilibrium with borrowing and lending
and risk sharing/insurance is constant prices (rD; rL; w; p), value functions
(v; vW ; vE), policy functions (k; n; c; a0) and either insurance policy x or ,
a probability measure , transition selector (z; dz0), and aggregate levels
(A;KL; KI ; D; L;N;NL; N I ; I; Y ), such that
1. at given prices the policy functions solve the optimization problem of each
agent (a; z);
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2. at given prices, the aggregate levels (KL; NL) and (KI ; N I) maximize prots
for the representative bank and insurance company;
3. the probability measure  is time invariant;
4. prices are such that markets clear: these are the market for deposits,
D =
Z
maxf0; a  kg(da dz) = L+KL +KI ;
the loans market,
L = ZB(KL)
B
(NL)1 
B
=
Z
E
maxf0; k   ag(da dz);
the risk-sharing market/insurance,
I = ZB(KI)
B
(N I)1 
B
;
where I is either
I = x(a; z)
Z
jE [(a; z0)jz]  (a; z0jz)j Q(z; dz0)(da dz);
or
I =
Z
max f0; (a; z)  (a; z0jz)g Q(z; dz0)(da dz);
and the labor market,
N =
Z
W
z0  (dz0)(da dz) =
Z
E
n(a; z)(da dz) +NL;
with Z
W
(da dz) +
Z
E
(da dz) = 1;
5. the aggregate feasibility constraint holds at equality: for goodsZ
fc(a; z0) + a0(a; z0)g(z; dz0)(da dz) =
=
Z
z0f(k(a; z); n(a; z))Q(z; dz0)(da dz) = Y;
and assets
A =
Z
a (da dz) =
Z
E
k(a; z)(da dz) +KL +KI :
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5 The Economy without Financial Intermedia-
tion
Finally, we include a description of an economy without nancial intermediation.
All agents have access to a storage technology that does not bring any return. Each
entrepreneur must nance his or her project from accumulated assets. Otherwise,
the structure of the this economy is identical to the previous ones. In particular,
there still exists a labor market where workers can be hired at an equilibrium
wage w. Entrepreneurs have access to the same production technology and assets
depreciate in production at a rate  2 (0; 1).
A worker now faces a budget constraint
c+ a0  a+ wz0:
An entrepreneur has a budget constraint
c+ a0  a+ (a; z0jz);
with prots equal to
(a; z0jz) = z0  kn1    k   wn:
Without nancial intermediation, there is a no-borrowing constraint
k  a:
The nancing constraint can be written, for z0 = z = 0,
(1  )a  (k   a)  wn  0; (12)
which is the same as for the benchmark economy with a zero interest rate (and
dierent equilibrium wage).
The denition of the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is similar to
that of the economy with nancial intermediation except for the market clearing
condition in the asset market. If the equilibrium exists, i.e., if there is a positive
fraction of workers (entrepreneurs), the total amount of capital used in production
is strictly smaller than the total amount of assets in the economy, K < A.
6 Characterization of Entrepreneurial Decisions
The occupational choice of an agent is based on the comparison of the expected
present discounted value of each career. The following two assumptions guarantee
the existence of a stationary recursive equilibrium with a positive fraction of the
population in each occupation.
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Assumption 1 The signal ability shock z is such that there exists an asset level
as for whichZ
vW (a; z0) (dz0) 
Z
vE(a; z0)Q(z; dz0) for all a  as:
Assumption 2 The signal ability shock z is such thatZ
vW (a; z0) (dz0) 
Z
vE(a; z0)Q(z; dz0) for all a 2 A:
Both assumptions are related to the opportunity cost of each occupation. The
rst assumption requires that there be a shock suciently high so that agents
with assets greater than a switching level as become entrepreneurs: the expected
value of entrepreneurship is greater than the expected value of choosing to work
for a wage. Vice versa, the second assumption requires a shock suciently low so
that agents with such a signal prefer to be workers.
The properties of value functions for each occupation follow the analysis in
Bohacek (2006) and Stokey et al. (1989). The value function of each occupation,
vI(a; z0), is strictly increasing in each argument since the utility function is strictly
increasing and strictly concave and a the constraint set is strictly increasing in
assets and the eective ability shock.
The expected value function of workers is independent of z and an increasing
and continuous function of a. Due to the monotonicity of the transition matrix
Q, the expected value function of entrepreneurs is an increasing and continuous
function of both a and z. Finally, the value function v(a; z) is non-decreasing in z
and strictly increasing in a.7
INSERT FIGURE 1
Figure 1 displays values related to the occupational decision of agents with
three levels of signal: low, zL, medium, zM , and high, zH . As the value function
of entrepreneurs is increasing in and that of workers independent of the signal
ability shock, it can be easily shown that for each z there is either none or at most
one switching level of assets as(z) decreasing in z. For given prices, all agents
below as(zH) are workers. Agents with the high signal ability shock switch to
entrepreneurship early at as(zH), agents with the medium signal shock at a
s(zM),
while agents with the lowest skill zL never become entrepreneurs, regardless of
their wealth. Thus the signal zH satises Assumption 1 and the signal zL satises
Assumption 2.
7The value function v(a; z)|the outer envelope for the value functions at each shock level|
may not be a concave function even if the value functions of workers and entrepreneurs are.
Gomes et al. (2001) analyze a model of unemployment with a similar property. The operator
on the value function satises the Blackwell's sucient conditions for a contraction mapping. In
this paper, we do not explore possible gains from randomization.
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6.1 The Future Value of Entrepreneurship
The experience aspect contained in the monotone Markov process has important
implications for the investment decisions of entering entrepreneurs. Contrary to
the static model in Lucas (1978), where agents only consider the current expected
incomes, it is the expected discounted present value of each career that determines
an agent's occupational decision.
For a given level of signal ability shock z 2 Z, an agent with assets at the switch-
ing level as(z) is indierent between working and undertaking an entrepreneurial
project. Therefore, it must be the case thatZ
vW (as(z); z0) (dz0) =
Z
vE(as(z); z0)Q(z; dz0): (13)
The rst order intertemporal condition for any asset level a and any realized eec-
tive ability shock z0 is just uc(c(a; z0)) = va(a0(a; z0); z0) as there is no uncertainty
about the agent's next period state. Using the usual envelope conditions and as-
suming interior solutions, the condition (13) can be rewritten, dropping the term
(1 + r) on both sides, asZ
va(a
0(as(z); z0); z0) (dz0) =
Z
va(a
0(as(z); z0); z0)Q(z; dz0):
Entrepreneurship has a future value if the transition process Q is suciently per-
sistent,
R
z0  (dz0) <
R
z0Q(z; dz0). In other words, the marginal entrepreneurs are
willing to sacrice current consumption for having the opportunity to begin their
business career that brings high returns only in the future. They invest a large
share of their income and wealth in order to relax the credit constraint and to run
their rm at the optimal size. For such agents the expected current income from
business might be lower than the current expected wage. Because the nancing
constraint prevents the entrepreneur from running the rm at the optimal size,
the above inequality might hold for several initial periods of entrepreneurship.8
6.2 Entrepreneurial Decisions
It is easy to show that in the three economies with nancial intermediation, all
entrepreneurs use the optimal capital-labor ratio
  k
n
=


1  

w
r + 

where r equals rL or rD depending on whether we are considering, respectively, a
borrowing or depositing entrepreneur. Because rL > rD, depositing entrepreneurs
run more capital intensive rms than those who borrow.
8In the search model with occupational choice by Gomes et al. (2001), consumption of
searchers similarly decreases compared to workers who keep their jobs.
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Because Q(z; fzg) > 0 for all z 2 Z, the nancing constraint must be satised
for the lowest eective ability shock z = 0. For the economy with borrowing and
lending only, the nancing constraint of a borrowing entrepreneur is
(1  )a  wn  (rL + ) (k   a)  0:
Using the optimal capital-labor ratio
k  

1 + rL
rL + 

a: (14)
This is a linear expression linking accumulated assets with the maximum level of
capital satisfying the nancing constraint. For the usual values of the parameters
 and  and the loan rate rL,


1 + rL
rL + 

> 1;
so that the maximum level of capital as a function of assets lies above the 45
degree line. Depositing entrepreneurs face a similar constraint with the deposit
rate rD instead of rL. However, as depositing entrepreneurs always satisfy k < a,
the nancing constraint applies only to the borrowing entrepreneurs.
INSERT FIGURE 2
To understand the role the nancing constraint plays in the size of rms, Figure
2 shows the choice of capital for a particular level of the productivity signal z. Asso-
ciated with this value of the productivity signal there are two unconstrained capital
levels, one for borrowing entrepreneurs, kL(a; z), and another one for depositing
entrepreneurs, kD(a; z), with kL(a; z) < kD(a; z). The straight line kc(a; rL) is the
nancing constraint (14) which lies above the 45 degree line.9 Given the value of
the productivity signal z, low levels of accumulated assets make the agent choose
to be a worker. As we increase assets we reach a threshold level as(z) at which the
agent becomes an entrepreneur. Whether the agent starts being nancially con-
strained depends on the position of the locus kc(a; rL) relative to the level kL(a; z)
for that particular level of assets. In this Figure, we assume the entrepreneur is
constrained so he can only increase capital along the nancial constraint. Eventu-
ally, he accumulates sucient assets and, at au(z; rL), becomes an unconstrained
with the optimal capital level for borrowing entrepreneurs. Maintaining this op-
timal capital level, he reaches a point of savings at which he can self-nance the
project, asf (z; rL). After this point, the return on capital is between (rL + ) and
(rD + ), and the entrepreneur continues to self-nance until he starts depositing
at the bank. At this level of assets au(z; rD) his rm reaches the optimal capital
size for the given signal ability shock.
9In the economies with risk sharing or insurance, this schedule will not, in general, be a
straight line.
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6.3 Financing Constraints
In the economy without nancial intermediation, the capital-labor ratio for an
unconstrained entrepreneur (with k < a) is
u  k
n
=


1  
w


:
For entrepreneurs who use all assets in production (k = a), the nancing constraint
in equation (12) implies
n 

1  
w

a:
That is, entrepreneurs with relatively low levels of assets and high skills may
be constrained in their choices of inputs. They will exhibit higher capital-labor
ratios than unconstrained entrepreneurs and, therefore, larger marginal produc-
tivities of capital. Financial intermediation allows these constrained entrepreneurs
to enter and/or borrow to expand their rms. On the other hand, unconstrained
entrepreneurs with low marginal productivities of capital will deposit and reduce
their rms. Eventually, general equilibrium eects will provide incentives for their
exit. As higher demand for inputs increases equilibrium prices, prots of low skill
entrepreneurs fall below the opportunity cost of forgone current and future wages.
The productivity composition of entrepreneurs improves.
Similarly, insurance and risk sharing alleviates the nancing constraint of the
benchmark economy. Using the fact that only borrowing entrepreneurs are con-
strained, rewrite the nancial constraint for the risk sharing economy (7) for
z0 = z = 0,
(1  )a+ x(1  p)E [y(a; z0)jz]  wn  (rL + )(k   a)  0: (15)
As output realizations y(a; z0) are non-negative, the nancing constraint is less
binding for choices x 2 (0; 1] if the price per one unit of transfer p < 1. If the price
is equal or greater than one, the optimal choice of risk sharing is zero.
The case of insurance contracts is more complicated as input decisions depend
on the amount of insurance an entrepreneur is taking. For a given pair of (a; z) of
a borrowing agent, denote the dierence in the value of inputs
  wn(a; z) + (rL + )(k(a; z)  a)  wn(a^; z) + (rL + )(k(a^; z)  a^) > 0;
because a^ < a and inputs are increasing in a for a given signal z. Rewrite the
nancing constraint in equation (11) as
(1  )a   wn  (rL + )(k   a) + maxy(a^; z) + ; 	
  (1 + p)
Z
max

0; y(a^; z)  y^(a^; z0jz)	 Q(z; dz0)  0;
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where y^ = y^(a^; z0jz) are the output realizations at each z0 and y(a^; z) is the output
level that corresponds to the denition of prot in a bad state (a^; z).
The nancing constraint is less binding if
y(a^; z) +  > (1 + p)
Z
max

0; y(a^; z)  y^(a^; z0jz)	 Q(z; dz0):
Again, this will be true if the price of the insurance premium and/or the insurance
level is not too high. Of course, choosing y(a^; z) = 0 allows the agent to avoid
insurance. Because output and  are non-negative, a non-zero insurance contract
relaxes the nancing constraint.
Each alleviation of the nancing constraint increases eciency. This is because,
conditional on a level of wealth, entrepreneurs with a high skill signal z can enter or
expand their rms, while general equilibrium eects provide incentives for low skill
entrepreneurs to reduce their rms or exit and become workers. Thus the number
of entrepreneurs is decreasing while their skills and size of rms are increasing in
the quality of nancial markets. In the next Section we show that the two steady
states with costly insurance and risk sharing are much more ecient than the
benchmark economy.
7 Quantitative Results
In this Section we present the results of numerical simulations of four station-
ary equilibria of the economy without nancial intermediation, of the benchmark
economy with borrowing and lending, and of the economies with nancial inter-
mediation combined with insurance and risk sharing.
7.1 Parameters of the Model
Parameters of the model are shown in Table 1 are standard for the U. S. economy
as in Cooley (1995). The span of managerial control  set at 0.912, a level close
to the one estimated by Burnside (1996). The utility has the logarithmic form.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The transition matrix for entrepreneurial skills has important implications for
the degree of business persistence and accumulation of wealth by business fami-
lies. I set the values of Q and the levels of shocks Z so that the model is able
to replicate the rst and second moments of the distribution of wealth. Similarly
to Veracierto (2001), we choose the eective ability shocks for the entrepreneurs
Z = f0g [ [1; z] with Q(f0g; f0g) = 1 so that an entrepreneur who fails with the
lowest eective ability shock will prefer to be a worker in the following period.
Also, Q(z; f0g) > 0 for all z 2 Z implies that all entrepreneurs terminate their
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businesses in nite time. The entries in the transition matrix are calculated using
annualized data from Table 1 in Evans (1987) on growth rates and exit rates of
rms in the Small Business Data Base constructed by the Oce of Advocacy of
the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA). The workers draw their eective
ability shocks from a xed distribution  with a lowest possible value equal to 0.5.
This specication of shocks and their laws of motion imposes the nancing con-
straint in each period and satises the assumptions on the existence of a stationary
equilibrium.
Productivity parameters are specied so that the outcomes in the nancial
intermediation economy match the data for the U.S. economy, with entrepreneurs
constituting 8% of the population and the average exit rate is around 5% (see
Evans (1987)). The discount factor and depreciation rate lead to capital-output
ratios equal to 3.89 in the benchmark, 3.23 in the insurance, and 3.16 in the risk
sharing steady state, respectively.
The corresponding parameters for the nancial intermediaries have been cal-
ibrated to match certain statistics of the US banking system. In particular, we
were trying to match the fraction of GDP produced by the nancial sector, the
fraction of capital and labor used in that sector and its capital/output ratio. It
is worth noting that, on average, the nancial sector is more labor intensive than
the rest of the economy. While nancial intermediaries use 1.3% of the capital in
the economy, they hire 4.2% of the labor force.10
The algorithm for nding the steady state of each regime is relatively simple. To
solve for the occupational decision, expected values of both options are computed
rst. We iterate on the wage and the interest rates (and insurance payments) until
markets are cleared, banks have zero prot and the conditions of the stationary
recursive competitive equilibrium are satised. Finally, we set the maximal level
of assets high enough so that the upper bound of the stationary distribution of
resources is endogenous.
The choice of risk sharing and insurance is expressed as a fraction of the ex-
pected prots of each entrepreneur, x. For the risk sharing contract, x 2 [0; 1] is
the fraction of prots subject to risk sharing transfers. For the insurance contract,
x = (a; z)=E[(a; z0)jz], where (a; z) is the choice of a prot level below which
the entrepreneur receives an insurance transfer and E[(a; z0)jz] is the expected
prot.
7.2 Steady State Without Financial Intermediation
The aggregate allocations of the economy without nancial intermediation are
shown in the rst column of Table 2. Occupational choice divides the population
into entrepreneurs (8%) and workers (92%). As there is no borrowing and lending,
10This data is taken from the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds Accounts, the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis Fixed Asset Tables and Employment by Industry.
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only 76.9% of aggregate assets are used in production. The capital-output ratio is
very high, above ve.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 3 shows the distributional eects of missing nancial markets on both
occupations: 78% of wealth, 51% of income, and 35% of consumption belongs to
entrepreneurs. Average entrepreneur consumes more than six times than the aver-
age worker. Correspondingly, the Gini coecients of wealth and income inequality
are very high, 0.94 and 0.51, respectively. The top 5% percentiles of agents own
83% of wealth and receive 48% of income.
Allocations of the median entrepreneur (in terms of wealth) are displayed in
Table 4. Entrepreneurs are using almost all their wealth in production. Return on
the median rm is 12.3%. Exit from entrepreneurship is a rare event at an average
rate 3.5%. While the distribution of rms by employment size is dominated by
very small rms (almost a half have fewer than 5 employees), majority of workers
are employed by the top decile of largest rms.11
We will discuss the eciency of these allocations in comparison with the other
steady states.
7.3 Steady State With Financial Intermediation
Financial markets aect agents' incentives to accumulate capital and provide access
to credit to agents with low level of accumulated wealth. They allocate resources
to individuals where the return is greatest, namely to potential and incumbent
entrepreneurs with a high signal ability shock whose projects are protable on a
larger scale than their individual savings allow.12
The second column of Table 2 shows that nancial intermediation allows all
assets to be used in production. The deposit rate is 1.08% and the lending rate is
2.96%. The cost of nancial intermediation amounts to only 2.5% of GDP, with a
higher share of labor (at 4.1% due to the sector's labor intensity).
The benchmark economy with borrowing and lending reduces the importance of
wealth on the occupational decision: the average skill of entrepreneurs increases by
11.7%, the total factor productivity by 19.4%. Table 2 provides another measure
of eciency, an average skill adjusted capital-to-asset ratio,

E =
Z
E
zk(a; z)
a
(da dz); (16)
11For a study of credit constraints in developing countries see an important eld study by
Paulson and Townsend (2002) who nd two-thirds of Thai business households nancially con-
strained, mostly due to a limited commitment problem faced by the poor entrepreneurs.
12There is a large literature on the importance of nancial markets for general economic activity
and economic growth, for example Gertler (1988), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga
and Smith (1991), King and Levine (1993), or Levine (1997).
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which describes the average quality of capital relative to a rm's (entrepreneur's)
total assets. In terms of this productivity measure, borrowing and lending is 1.62
times more ecient than the economy without nancial markets.
The total output increases by 12.5%. Around 79% of entrepreneurs nance
their projects by taking loans with an average leverage ratio 0.48. As talent matters
more, turnover between occupations increases, with exit rate now 4.9%, close to
the data in Evans (1987) and Davis et al. (1996). Relative to the economy without
nancial intermediation, the capital-output ratio falls to 3.89.
While nancial intermediation allows all assets to be used in production, the
aggregate stock is now only 66% of that in the steady state without nancial
intermediation. These results suggest two possible interpretations. First, nancial
markets reduce the need for accumulation of assets in order to prepare for starting a
rm when an entrepreneurial opportunity arises. Second, the absence of complete
insurance markets in the face of idiosyncratic shocks leads to a precautionary
demand for assets.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Financial intermediation delivers a welfare gain of 17.5%. The main benecia-
ries of nancial intermediation are workers: Greater competition in the occupation
market increases welfare of workers by 41% while that of entrepreneurs falls by
71% (they are still much better o than workers). Compared to the economy with-
out nancial markets, the equilibrium wage increases by 43% and there is now a
positive return on savings. Both of these represent higher costs to entrepreneurs
whose average prots, welfare, and fraction in the population fall.13
A more ecient allocation of resources reduces the rent to wealth, with Gini
inequality measures decreasing to 0.87 for wealth and especially due to high wages
to 0.32 for income. Entrepreneurs now hold only 69% of wealth and 35% of income
(numbers still much higher than in the U.S. economy). Occupational choice of het-
erogenous agents and the investment decisions of wealth-constrained entrepreneurs
is important for matching U.S. distributional data. In particular, saving and invest-
ment decisions of entrepreneurs are capable of generating very unequal distribution
of wealth.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
13Self-employment in countries with less developed nancial markets high, often close to 50%,
mostly in agriculture. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue and Gine and Townsend (2004) show
on Thai data that in an economy with underdeveloped nancial markets, incumbent rms enjoy
some rents in the markets they operate in, but they also end up appropriating most of the
returns from new ventures. These rents might be impaired by nancial development, mostly by
the entrance of new and more productive rms. This fact suggests a plausible political economy
rational for observed nancial sector repression.
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Table 4 shows that the median entrepreneur's rm becomes larger and pro-
duces more than 30% higher output than the median rm in the economy without
nancial intermediation. The median entrepreneur has a leverage ratio equal to
0.81 and return 7.9%. Small entrepreneurs borrow from the banks more often than
large entrepreneurs, which is also consistent with the data.14 The share of very
small rms with fewer than 5 workers falls to 38%.
7.4 Steady States with Insurance and Risk Sharing
Insurance markets might be extremely important for poor entrepreneurs. We an-
alyze the insurance aspect of nancial markets in two separate steady states with
insurance and risk-sharing. Recall that the ex-ante insurance contract insures a
chosen fraction of an entrepreneur's prot for a premium paid ex-ante, before the
actual shock to production is revealed. As the ability to pay the premium depends
an entrepreneur's wealth, it only partially relaxes the nancing constraint. The
risk sharing contract does not require a prepaid premium: in this way, it facilitates
an unconstrained entry into entrepreneurship. On the other hand, it demands a
transfer of funds from the entrepreneur when his project is successful.
Interest rates on deposits and loans increase substantially as assets become
more productive. The nancial sector is around 5% of GDP, absorbing between
6 and 7 percent of labor force. The capital-output ratio falls further to 3.23 and
3.16, respectively in the insurance and risk-sharing steady states. Average leverage
is now 1.50 and 1.97. Table 3 shows that the share of entrepreneurs in deposits
decreases with the quality of nancial markets. This means that there are fewer
entrepreneurs who overaccumulate assets compared to their managerial abilities.
Both insurance and risk sharing further increase the eciency of capital allo-
cation: by 6% in terms of average skill in entrepreneurship versus the benchmark
nancial intermediation and 18% versus the economy without nancial markets.
In terms of total factor productivity, it is around 7% and 28%, respectively. In
terms of the skill adjusted capital-to-asset ratio 
E in equation (16), risk sharing
is 1.2 times more ecient than insurance, 2.2 times more than the benchmark
steady state, and 3.5 times more ecient than the economy without nancial in-
termediation. As in Moll (2010), the number of entrepreneurs decreases and their
productivity increases with the quality of nancial markets.15
14Arellano et al. (2009) nd that rms in countries with more developed nancial markets tend
to have larger leverage ratios (close to 1.0) and that the leverage-rm size relation is generally
downward sloping: small rms have relatively higher leverage ratios than large rms. In the
underdeveloped countries, the opposite is true.
15OECD and World Bank surveys show that the fraction of self-employed workers in developing
countries{where nancial markets are also less developed{is much larger than in industrialized
countries. These entrepreneurs operate at very low inecient levels of capital and skills. See also
Bloom and Van Reenen (2009) for a survey of management practices across rms and countries.
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Table 4 shows that the insurance economy matches the U.S. data for shares
of wealth and income held by entrepreneurs (0.40 and 0.21). In this steady state,
entrepreneurs hold 9.4 times more wealth than workers, 3.7 times more income and
consume 2.2 more. The wealth to income ratio of the median entrepreneur is 4.9.
In the risk sharing economy these measures are lower, especially those for assets:
entrepreneurs save less because, rst, there is no ex-ante insurance premium, and
second, successful entrepreneurs must transfer prots back to the risk sharing pool.
With insurance markets, agents in the top wealth percentile own more than 20%
of the total wealth and receive 7-8% of the total income. The match with the U.S.
data for the top 5% and 10% percentiles of agents is even better. Entrepreneurs
are still over-represented in the top percentiles of the wealth distribution. Eight
percent of all entrepreneurs come from the top percentile, and majority of en-
trepreneurs from the top docile of wealth distribution (similar to data collected by
Quadrini (1999a)).
Given the increased eciency, workers' equilibrium wages increase even more,
together with their welfare. Risk sharing reduces entrepreneurs' prots due to
transfers in all states of the world and thus decreases their average welfare. All
relative measures related to entrepreneurs fall as well: their fraction in the popu-
lation, their share of wealth and income, or return on their projects. In Table 4,
the median rm is now twice as big as in the economy without nancial interme-
diation, producing three times more output. Around 70% of rms (both in terms
of distribution and employment share) are now concentrated around this median
rm size while rms with fewer than 5 workers represent only 2% of all rms.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Figure 3 shows the allocation of capital in production as a function of assets. If
allocation of capital were optimal, the allocation of capital would be independent of
entrepreneurs' wealth, i.e. it would be a horizontal line. Risk sharing and insurance
regimes are the closest to the horizontal allocation, rising only at the top percentiles
where wealthy entrepreneurs nance large projects. The benchmark borrowing and
lending and especially the economy without nancial intermediation show a strong
dependence of capital allocation on wealth. The beginning of each represents
the entry asset level: insurance and risk sharing allows for entry of very poor
entrepreneurs, while the absence of nancial markets has the highest switching level
of assets. The dots on each line represent deciles of the wealth distribution among
entrepreneurs (the last four dots are the 90th, 95th, 99th and 100th percentiles). In
the economy without nancial markets these top percentiles are extremely wealthy.
Insurance and risk sharing markets lead to a more concentrated distribution of
wealth.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
26
Figure 4 displays the capital allocation for dierent signal productivity shocks
z again as a function of wealth with shown percentiles. At given equilibrium
prices, the capital allocation is close to optimal for the highest level of shock z8.
Capital allocation at the lower shock z7 resembles that of the average entrepreneur
while for the next shock z6, capital increases in wealth and starts only at the 60th
percentile. Notice also that with the ex-ante insurance premium, entrepreneurs
with the highest shock are not represented in the bottom two deciles.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Figure 5 shows the degree to which entrepreneurs choose to insure their
projects. First, in both insurance and risk sharing steady states, the highest
ability entrepreneurs insure the most: in the insurance regime almost half of their
prots and almost full prots in the risk sharing regime as their projects and po-
tential losses large. Second, the poor entrepreneurs insure more than entrepreneurs
around the median wealth. Finally, the policies are not monotone in wealth: this
could be a sign of binding ex-ante premium constraints for entrepreneurs who run
larger projects with median wealth.16
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
Policy functions for capital allocation as function of wealth for all steady states
are shown in Figure 6 (drawn are policy functions for capital at signal produc-
tivities where occupation decision is entrepreneurial). The existence of nancial
intermediation allows for capital allocation that is greater than assets held by an
entrepreneur (policies above the 45-degree line). Depositing entrepreneurs have
policy functions below the 45-degree line. The two bottom panels illustrate the
dierence between insurance and risk sharing: the ex-ante insurance premium lim-
its the size of projects for poor entrepreneurs (upward sloping policies for z7 and
z8), while ex-post risk sharing allows ecient allocation of capital even at the low-
est levels of wealth (horizontal policies for the same shocks). Note that agents
with z6 do not borrow and enter when they are self-nancing because the cost of
borrowing and the opportunity cost of being a worker are too high. In the bench-
mark economy with borrowing and lending, these self-nanced entrepreneurs exist
at the next lower level z5. Finally, in the economy without nancial intermediation
even agents with a low signal z4 are entrepreneurs. These policies document that
the entry threshold of z increases in the quality of nancial markets. The pool
of entrepreneurs becomes more talented and capital ows to the most protable
projects.
16Entrepreneurs in the insurance steady state and shock z6 do insure but very little. Their
choices of x = (a; z6)=E [(a; z
0)jz6] are less than -50. For presentation purposes we do not
show this line in the Figure. Its shape is similar to the risk sharing policy for the same shock.
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INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
Figure 7 shows the capital-to-assets ratios during the entrepreneurial spell of
an average entrant. The risk sharing contract allows the average entrant to borrow
the most against his assets, closely followed by the insurance contract. The ratio
falls quickly during the spell. Basic borrowing and lending without any insurance
fares much worse, with the ratio around two for rst ten periods of the spell:
During these initial periods of entrepreneurship rms operate at very inecient
capital levels. Note that as successful entrepreneurs invest almost a half of their
prots, most of them are able to nance their project without borrowing after
twenty periods of occupational tenure.
The bottom panels of Figure 8 shows that insurance and risk sharing as a
fraction of expected prots decreases in entrepreneurial spell. Entrepreneurs with
the highest shock and the highest leverage insure around one half of their expected
prots and for the rst 10 periods they fully share their risk. The relationship
between insurance and spell is not monotone for those with the second highest
shock. The insurance taking decreases from very high levels (when their leverage
and exposure to large losses is the highest) as agents accumulate assets; it then
increases at very long tenures when projects are very large. Again, the ex-ante
insurance taking is almost negligible for those with the z6 and is not shown on the
Figure.
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
This Figure shows that insurance markets are especially important for the most
skilled entrants. The price of insurance services is around 0.1 per unit of transfer.
The cost of ex-ante insurance represents 8% of average or 11% of median prots
(as the premium is actuarially fair and applies only to the set of bad states) while
the cost of ex-post risk sharing is much more, 34% and 47%, respectively (as the
transfers are paid in all states). This is also the reason why in the insurance steady
state accumulates more assets as disposable prots are larger.
Overall, both types of insurance have sizeable eects on the allocation of re-
sources and their distribution. The eciency gains are large, around one half of
those from introducing the benchmark credit markets to the economy without -
nancial intermediation.17 Our results do not change substantially when insurance
is also available to workers.
17Results in Meh (2008) nds these business risk eects much smaller than those of nancial
constraints. However, in his model the entrepreneurs do not face much risk as the choice of
capital is made after observing the productivity shock. This is also the case of Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2009).
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7.4.1 Default, Moral Hazard, and Adverse Selection
We are aware of the fact that the insurance and risk sharing contracts are subject
to moral hazard, and for the insurance contracts, also to adverse selection problem
(see Cooley et al. (2004) for an excellent example). Indeed, Karaivanov et al.
(2006) nd that moral hazard is an important source in credit market imperfec-
tions.
In our model, if output is unobservable, entrepreneurs might report a lower
eective productive shock to the nancial intermediary and receive a higher in-
surance or risk sharing transfer. Similarly, an entrepreneur might be reluctant to
deliver a risk sharing transfer to the intermediary if his realized prots are very
high. Also, the adverse selection problem is present in the insurance contracts:
an entrepreneur might report a higher signal ability z and pay a lower insurance
premium. Entrepreneurs might also default on their loans and/or wages of hired
workers.
These contractual problems might preclude some of the insurance and risk
sharing contracts we found in our numerical simulations. Since in both insurance
and risk sharing economies agents can choose zero insurance or risk sharing, the
eciency gains under asymmetric information will lie between that of the bench-
mark nancial intermediation and those of our full information cases. We plan to
analyze our model with asymmetric information and default in our future work.
8 Conclusions
This paper shows that nancial constraints are important for entrepreneurial en-
try and rm size decisions. General equilibrium eects related to removing these
constraints are large and crucial for the skill composition of entrepreneurs. Finally,
borrowing and lending by itself may not be sucient for the most ecient alloca-
tion of capital to entrepreneurial skills. Only when nancial markets also insure
entrepreneurs against their income risk, the allocation of resources becomes much
more ecient.
These results are important for the pivotal role small rms play in innovation,
technological change, productivity growth as well as creation of new jobs. Baily
et al. (1992) document that about half of the overall productivity growth in
U.S. manufacturing in the 1980s can be attributed to factor reallocation from
low productivity to high productivity establishments. Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008) show that government policies targeting entry of nancially constrained and
skilled entrepreneurs can have signicant impact on occupational choice, eciency,
aggregate levels and the distribution of resources.
Taken together, eciency of production increases in the quality of nancial
markets. There are many important issues the paper does not address. Our
framework can be used to study the eect of technology innovations on entry and
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exit into entrepreneurship. Jermann and Quadrini (2003) analyze the impact of
technology innovations in a similar model with heterogeneous rms and limited
enforceability of nancial contracts. Financial intermediation can be modeled in a
greater detail: The banks could optimally provide multiperiod loans, break even
only in expectation, or require collateral that ts the needs and characteristics of
the entrepreneurs. Finally, we plan to address the issue of default, moral hazard,
and adverse selection in our future work.
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Parameters
 E B   ZB 
0.965 0.32 0.15 0.912 0.043 35.0 1.0
Ability Shocks Z = fz1; : : : ; z8g
0 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.25 2.50
Distribution  of Workers' Ability Shocks
0.10 0.70 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0
Transition Matrix Q for Entrepreneurs' Ability Shocks
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.109 0.698 0.192 0.001 0 0 0 0
0.059 0.095 0.713 0.131 0.002 0 0 0
0.053 0.001 0.111 0.736 0.098 0.001 0 0
0.044 0.004 0.015 0.107 0.755 0.074 0.001 0
0.039 0 0 0.001 0.162 0.756 0.041 0.001
0.025 0 0 0 0.008 0.172 0.758 0.037
0.018 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.339 0.642
Notes: Workers' lowest ability shock z1 = 0:5.
Table 1: Parameters of the model.
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Steady States
Financial Intermediation
Average No F.I. Benchmark Insurance Risk Sharing
Entrepreneurs 8.0% 7.8% 6.6% 6.5%
Assets 6.90 4.56 3.79 3.65
Capital
Production 5.31 4.44 3.67 3.52
Financial | 0.12 0.12 0.13
Output 1.04 1.17 1.19 1.17
Welfare 0.80 0.94 0.97 0.96
Equilibrium Prices
Wage w 1.03 1.47 1.59 1.59
Deposit Rate rD | 1.08 2.57 2.78
Loan Rate rL | 2.96 4.88 5.06
Price of Insurance p | | 0.10 0.11
Capital-Output 5.09 3.89 3.23 3.16
Leverage | 0.48 1.50 1.97
Insurance/Assets | | 0.02 0.06
Insurance/Income | | 0.08 0.34
Borrowers (%) | 79.3 74.6 77.1
Spell 26.1 20.6 13.0 12.8
Exit Rate 4.1% 4.9% 8.2% 8.2%
Eciency
Average Entr. Skills 1.79 2.00 2.12 2.12
TFP 1.29 1.54 1.64 1.65
Capital Skill / Assets 1.78 2.90 5.26 6.29
Share of the Financial Intermediation Sector
Capital | 0.020 0.032 0.036
Labor | 0.041 0.064 0.070
Output | 0.025 0.047 0.054
Notes: `No F.I.' is the steady state without nancial intermediation. Output in the
goods sector only. Capital Skill / Assets is dened as the product of entrepreneurial
skill and capital in production divided by assets held by the entrepreneur. Includes
the insurance sector (the share of insurance in GDP is less than one percent, 0.004,
the share of risk sharing is 0.006).
Table 2: Steady states.
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Distribution and Entrepreneurs
Financial Intermediation
Average No F.I. Benchmark Insurance Risk Sharing
Welfare 0.80 0.94 0.97 0.96
Workers 0.56 0.79 0.90 0.90
Entrepreneurs 3.58 2.51 1.96 1.77
Gini Measure of Inequality
Wealth 0.94 0.87 0.81 0.77
Income 0.51 0.32 0.25 0.23
Asset Percentiles
Top 1% 0.44 0.32 0.23 0.20
Top 5% 0.83 0.70 0.59 0.53
Top 10% 0.96 0.85 0.76 0.70
Top 20% 0.98 0.93 0.86 0.82
Top 40% 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.91
Income Percentiles
Top 1% 0.25 0.13 0.08 0.07
Top 5% 0.48 0.30 0.21 0.19
Top 10% 0.56 0.39 0.30 0.28
Top 20% 0.68 0.47 0.40 0.39
Top 40% 0.87 0.83 0.56 0.56
Entrepreneurs Share in Total
Assets 0.78 0.69 0.40 0.33
Income 0.51 0.35 0.21 0.19
Consumption 0.35 0.23 0.13 0.12
Deposits | 0.12 0.05 0.04
Notes: `No F.I.' is the steady state without nancial intermediation.
Table 3: Distribution and Entrepreneurs.
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Median Entrepreneur
Financial Intermediation
Median No F.I. Benchmark Insurance Risk Sharing
Assets 30.1 19.6 13.7 9.7
Capital 30.0 35.5 52.8 59.7
Labor 5.2 7.3 13.0 15.0
Output 6.3 9.4 16.6 19.4
Prot 3.7 2.9 2.8 2.8
Return 12.3% 7.9% 5.3% 4.7%
Capital-Output 4.76 3.78 3.18 3.08
Leverage | 0.81 2.85 5.15
Insurance/Assets | | 0.02 0.13
Insurance/Prot | | 0.11 0.47
Spell 18.4 14.2 8.3 8.2
Exit Rate 3.5% 5.3% 8.6% 8.6%
Notes: Median entrepreneur in terms of wealth. `No F.I.' is the steady state
without nancial intermediation.
Table 4: Median Entrepreneur.
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Figure 1: Value functions of entrepreneurs and workers.
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Figure 2: Policy function for capital allocation as a function of wealth and skill.
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Figure 3: Average capital in production as a function of entrepreneurial wealth.
Dots represent deciles of the entrepreneurial distribution of wealth (1st, 2nd, ...)
with the last four dots denoting the 90th, 95th, 99th, and 100th percentile, respec-
tively.
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Figure 4: Capital in production for dierent productivity signals z as a function
of entrepreneurial wealth. The dots represent deciles of the entrepreneurial distri-
bution of wealth (1st, 2nd, ...) with the last four dots denoting the 90th, 95th,
99th, and 100th percentile, respectively.
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Figure 5: Insurance and risk sharing for dierent productivity signals z as a func-
tion of entrepreneurial wealth. The dots represent deciles of the entrepreneurial
distribution of wealth (1st, 2nd, ...) with the last four dots denoting the 90th,
95th, 99th, and 100th percentile, respectively.
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Figure 6: Capital in production for dierent productivity signals z by en-
trepreneurial wealth. Policy functions conditional on agents' being entrepreneurs.
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Figure 7: Ratio of capital in production to assets during an average entrepreneurial
spell.
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Figure 8: Ratio of capital in production to assets and insurance during average
entrepreneurial spells for dierent productivity signals z.
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